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Abstract 
 
In this position paper, I argue that the main purpose of research is to discover and report on 
phenomena in a truthful manner. Once uncovered, these phenomena can have important 
implications for society. The utility of research depends on whether it makes a contribution 
because it is original or can add to cumulative research efforts, is rigorously and reliably done, 
and is able to inform basic or applied research and later policy. However, five serious “diseases” 
stifle the production of useful research. These diseases include: Significosis, an inordinate focus 
on statistically significant results; neophilia, an excessive appreciation for novelty; theorrhea, a 
mania for new theory; arigorium, a deficiency of rigor in theoretical and empirical work; and 
finally, disjunctivitis, a proclivity to produce large quantities of redundant, trivial, and incoherent 
works. I surmise that these diseases have caused immense harm to science and have cast doubt on 
the role of science in society. I discuss what publication gatekeepers should do to eradicate these 
diseases, to stimulate the undertaking of more useful and impactful research, and to provide the 
needed incentives to better align the interests of researchers with those greater good. Finally, I 
highlight where technical improvements are needed to enhance research quality, and call on 
deeper reflection, transparency, and honesty in how we do research.  
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In an accidental conversation during my postdoc, I learned about the importance of different 
scientific modes of discovery and their implications for policy. I interacted often with one of my 
neighbors, Lisa, who was a postdoc too; we never really talked about work because most of the 
time we met, we had our hands full with our young children who were play friends. I knew she 
did research in molecular biology or something like that. One day, when the moment was 
opportune, I asked Lisa what she was working on precisely and she replied “protein trafficking.” 
I jokingly asked whether that involved smuggling proteins across country borders! She 
responded, “No silly, but you are not far off—I am trying to understand how proteins are 
transported in and out of cells.”  
“Why study that?” I asked her. Given my ignorance, I did not immediately see the point of 
what Lisa was doing and inquired how research of this sort could inform practice, whether in 
medicine or elsewhere. She said that she did not care about practical implications for the time 
being; those would come as the phenomenon was better understood. After several discussions 
with her, and many similar discussions with other researchers, I began to appreciate the 
importance of what she did. Many years later, this conversation sprang to mind when the 2013 
Nobel Prize in physiology/medicine was awarded to researchers working on just this topic—one 
that has provided the foundation for many important medical applications.  
The conversation I had with Lisa has often intrigued me and is a relevant starting point to set 
the stage for this position paper, and for better understanding the defining characteristics of useful 
science.
1
 Whether reading an article about neutrinos, the evolutionary origins of our decision-
making, or whether leadership can be taught, the answers to the following three generic questions 
should provide some indication of the potential importance of the article, and whether it will go 
on to have an impact:  
                                                          
1
 Note I use the terms “science” and “research” as well as “scientist” and “researcher” interchangeably.  
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1. So what?  
2. Is it rigorous?  
3. Will it make a difference?  
These questions are vital ones to ask because their answers can inform us if the article is useful to 
the scientific record. I realize too that these are judgment calls and that as editors we are not 
perfect prognosticators—yet, I will lay out a case in this article regarding how we might better 
determine if an article will be impactful. The answer to the “so what” question informs us if the 
theoretical or empirical contribution is original, or if the finding—even if not original—is one 
that would contribute to cumulative research efforts. The “rigor” answer informs us about the 
robustness, accuracy, and reliability of the research, and if it reflects the actual description, 
process, or causal relation uncovered. Finally, the “will it make a difference” answer gives an 
indication concerning the extent to which the finding can inform basic research, so that we can 
better understand the building blocks of the phenomenon; if the research is more applied in 
scope, the research should inform policy or practice.  
Even if relevancy may not immediately be evident does not imply that practice cannot be 
informed at a later stage of the scientific process. At this point, I wish to be clear on one key 
issue: There is no tradeoff between rigor and relevance as some management scholars have 
suggested (e.g., Bennis & O'Toole, 2005). Research that is not rigorous simply cannot be 
relevant (F. Vermeulen, 2005). The relevance-rigor debate is a false dichotomy. Yet, we as 
leadership scholars must do more to ensure that our research enters public policy debates because 
what we study has important practical implications. Our conduit to public policy should not be 
only via behavioral economics, as it is for some psychology theories that have been formalized 
by economists (Chetty, 2015). We must show leadership! 
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In this position paper I reflect on how science is currently being done and on how science 
should be done to ensure it is accurate and ultimately useful. Of course, there is a great deal of 
good research that has been published across all fields of science, including by leadership 
researcher. Yet, merely looking at a mainstay metric of research utility—citations—shows that 
many articles simply do not receive many citations (as has been long established: D. Hamilton, 
1991) and the leadership field is not exempt from this criticism (Antonakis, Bastardoz, Liu, & 
Schriesheim, 2014). I am also deeply troubled when findings are not accurately reported 
(Atwater, Mumford, Schriesheim, & Yammarino, 2014), even on simple things like p-values 
(Nuijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2016) or degrees of freedom (Cortina, 
Green, Keeler, & Vandenberg, 2016) . Not all of these errors should be attributed to fraud 
because most scientists are well-intentioned; but because of institutional incentive structures and 
cultural transmission of research practices, oftentimes research gets published that does not help 
advance science or practice (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; Smaldino & McElreath, 2016). There 
are many reasons why this phenomenon may occur, but suffice it to say that it should be 
unconscionable to well-intended scientists that resources—in the form of salaries, institutional 
support, or time spent by journals to publish papers—are squandered on research that may not be 
useful.  
We cannot hope these problems away. Science is not necessarily self-correcting because 
the process of publication may not be correctly managed by the publication gatekeepers. For 
whatever reasons, including failure to robustly replicate research, there are simply too many 
findings that become “received doctrines” (Barrett, 1972) or “unchallenged fallacies” (Ioannidis, 
2012). We have to collectively make an effort to address this problem and to ensure that what is 
published is robustly done, tentatively accepted, and then actively challenged. Only then can we 
claim to approach the truth. How we do our science therefore matters much, which is why we 
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need more Socratic-type academic gadflies who do “meta-research” and reflect on how we can 
improve our scientific practice (Ioannidis, Fanelli, Dunne, & Goodman, 2015). 
On another front, high-profile scientific scandals—whether about retractions or 
replication failures—have been picked-up by the mass media; such exposure is necessary, but at 
the same time it sullies the reputation of scientists and raises doubts about the place of science in 
this world. At the same time, we are in an era where any kind of information can come across as 
being credible if put on a website. It is no wonder we have anti-vaxxers, climate change deniers, 
evolution doubters, even flat-earthers, and this despite broad consensus from experts about the 
actual state-of-the-science regarding these issues (Achenbach, 2015). Sadly, this anti-
intellectualism is evident in many walks of life (Jacoby, 2009); worse, even mainstream political 
parties actively undermine science (Mooney, 2005). 
To correct the status quo, it will take effort and courage, and most importantly, a different 
way of managing the publication process. I will thus openly discuss challenges that science faces, 
not just in our field, but across a broad array of fields. Although I will borrow from general 
discussions and debates from a variety of disciplines, I will focus my paper on how we can 
improve on the scientific study of leadership.  
Diseases that threaten the viability of science 
We are in an era where submitting an article is a click away, where there is fierce 
competition to publish in top-ranked outlets, and where journals compete to draw what they 
believe will be impactful papers in terms of future citations; every researcher is vying to publish 
in high impact journals and every journal wants to have a high impact factor. Sexy and 
statistically significant findings are the talk of the day, particularly in psychology (Bakker, van 
Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Ellemers, 2013). But journals are not always publishing robust and 
policy-relevant findings. Defective studies often slip through (B. H. Hamilton & Nickerson, 
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2003), and our field is no exception (see Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014; Antonakis, 
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; Fischer, Dietz, & Antonakis, 2016). This problem is not just 
about inattentive peer reviewers or editors. Although I cannot provide a full and definitive 
diagnosis of the problem, the most likely explanation may have to do with the conditions and the 
incentives that are in place to reward success in the production of research. It involves 
institutions, journals, and authors. What constitutes good research performance for institutions 
and what determines whether it is published by journals sets the goals for authors.  
It all begins with well-intentioned scientists who sometimes may have, what is nicely 
called, “hypothesis myopia”—that is, a desire to seek evidence to confirm what they are looking 
for (Nuzzo, 2015), the well-known problem of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). Consider the 
case of Jacques Benveniste, an immunologist. He and his team made the revolutionary discovery 
that water had “memory,” which proved to him that homeopathy—whose core belief is to dilute 
the active ingredient to infinitesimal levels to the point where no molecule of the ingredient can 
be detected—had real effects. Aficionados of homeopathy cheered. However, a controlled 
replication demonstrated that the results reported by Benveniste and his team—results that 
violated the laws of physics and chemistry and which were theoretically impossible—were 
flawed. The explanation was simple: The technicians, who counted how many cells reacted to 
homeopathically-treated or normal water, were not blinded to the treatments and “found” the 
effect that they were expecting (Maddox, 1988; Maddox, Randi, & Stewart, 1988).  
Problems of this sort—that is, publishing research that may not be accurate—are 
happening in our field too not only because of ideologically-motivated or badly-trained scientists, 
but because the incentive structure in the publication game is wrong, particularly with respect to 
what constitutes a contribution. When contribution is equated to novel and statistically 
significant, and when replication or null findings are frowned upon and hardly ever undertaken 
7 
 
(Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012)—and by replication I 
mean also by independent researcher groups and not just “replications” by the same authors in the 
same article—it is no wonder that the research landscape is littered with erroneous results 
(Ioannidis, 2005). Studies that are wrong, and consequently the theories that they have helped 
build, have to be decommissioned. Only findings or theories that stand the test of time, because 
they have survived attempted refutation (Popper, 1989), should be used to guide research and 
policy. Tavris and Aronson (2007, p. 108) put it nicely by noting that ‘‘the scientific method 
consists of the use of procedures designed to show not that our predictions and hypotheses are 
right, but that they might be wrong.” 
There is better way to do science and editors are duty-bound to their editorial discretion to 
serve the greater good. Recently, I have also been involved in an initiative where we have laid out 
a sensible agenda to start dealing with the issues our discipline faces (Grote, 2016)—I use ideas 
from here, as well as many other sources (e.g., Bakker, et al., 2012; Banks, Rogelberg, Woznyj, 
Landis, & Rupp, 2016; Bettis, Ethiraj, Gambardella, Helfat, & Mitchell, 2016; Ellemers, 2013; 
Ioannidis, 2014; Nosek, et al., 2012), my previous methodological work, and the many 
conversations I have had with colleagues on the topic over the years, whether in our field or 
others. Distilling the general problems science faces, and those of our field in particular, was not 
easy because I had to read across disciplines; however, I hope that my efforts here will make the 
core issues and challenges we collectively face more understandable so that the measures I 
propose make sense. 
Because of the incentive structures that institutions and journals set as well as the 
propagation of particular types of research practices, progress in our science is impeded by five 
major “diseases.” These diseases may not have unique causes and they intertwined. I named them 
as such to group together, in a simple way, the conditions that stifle the production of good 
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science whether in the social sciences or beyond. I have called them diseases and given them 
pernicious sounding names to draw attention to how serious these impediments are to science. 
The diseases include: (a) a fixation on statistically significant results (“significosis”), (b) an 
obsession for novel work (“neophilia”), (c) a fetish for new theory (“theorrhea”), (d) a lack of 
rigor in developing theory and undertaking empirical work (“arigorium”), and (e) a penchant to 
accumulate large amounts of disparate factoids, salami sliced output, and trivial works, with little 
attempt at theoretical integration (“disjunctivitis”).  
Disease 1: Significosis 
Even if we assume that most scientists are competent, ethical, and are motivated to do 
their jobs correctly, and even if good research is being published, the system still produces an 
overall biased distribution of estimates. It is usually statistically-significant results that get 
published (H. Cooper, DeNeve, & Charlton, 1997). This problem is pervasive and occurs “when 
the probability that a result is published depends on the estimates produced by the study, holding 
the methodological quality of the study fixed” (Gerber & Malhotra, 2008, p. 4). In other words, 
the distribution of effects—because of chance or other causes—is clearly biased and does not 
represent what is actually out there (Banks, Rogelberg, et al., 2016; Ioannidis, 2016a). The 
problem of publication bias is ubiquitous and evident across many fields (Pfeiffer, Bertram, & 
Ioannidis, 2011) making it difficult to reconstruct the distribution of effect sizes. Yet it is easy to 
shoot down bad research via critical analysis, re-analysis of results, simulation, or replication. 
Biased effect-size distributions are used as foundations for future theory and feed into meta-
analyses. Perhaps the effects claimed are real; perhaps they are not. The problem is that because 
they are statistically significant and published, they become legitimized and part of the research 
canon, and may be used to guide future research and decide policy.  
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Disease 2: Neophilia 
It is the discovery of the truth that we should be rewarding “and not about getting 
spectacular, but wrong results” (Ioannidis, 2012, p. 652). For instance, “power posing” (Carney, 
Cuddy, & Yap, 2010)—wherein a brief pose can apparently significantly increase testosterone 
levels and risk taking—captured the imagination of the public because these highly novel and 
groundbreaking findings suggested that anyone could become powerful in a few minutes. The 
study is the research pillar for the most viewed TED talk of all time and a best-selling book by 
one of the coauthors (i.e., Cuddy). However, subsequent findings indicate that blinding 
experimenters to treatment nullifies the power-posing effect (Ranehill et al., 2015) in addition to 
other statistical issues that show that this effect does not exist (Simmons & Simonsohn, in press).  
It is a plain fact that top empirical journals insist on findings that are novel, innovative 
and interesting (Cortina, 2016; Mathieu, 2016; C. C. Miller & Bamberger, 2016; Nosek, et al., 
2012).  Null results and replications as well as exploratory research is simply not seen as 
interesting or innovative enough by top journals (Cortina, 2016; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; 
Mathieu, 2016; C. C. Miller & Bamberger, 2016; Nosek, et al., 2012)—some journals, however, 
are finally breaking ranks (Bettis, et al., 2016; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; R. S. Landis, James, 
Lance, Pierce, & Rogelberg, 2014; C. C. Miller & Bamberger, 2016). We need to radically shift 
prevailing wisdom to make a difference, and more progressive thinking is needed across the 
board. We can learn much from null results and replications; empirical exploratory work, which 
is not, as many think, the province of qualitative researchers, is needed too (Lapierre, Edwards, 
Oswald, Shockley, & Landis, 2017).  
Disease 3: Theorrhea 
 In addition to management journals like the Academy of Management Review (AMR), 
which only publishes theory articles, many of the top empirical journals expect that articles make 
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a theoretical contribution (Hambrick, 2007; Locke, 2007). Yet, ironically, 90% of 
theories/models published in AMR are never tested (Kacmar & Whitfield, 2000). More recent 
evidence, looking at the top-cited articles in AMR confirms that almost none of the theoretical 
propositions are directly tested in empirical research (Edwards, Berry, & Stewart, 2016). It is 
rather odd that we have “theory envy” when the best theories our field produces are never tested. 
Of course theory—in terms of explaining a phenomenon by describing how variables are causally 
related, why they are related, and the boundary conditions under which the relations hold 
(Bacharach, 1989; Dubin, 1976)—is very useful for guiding future research. I therefore strongly 
support efforts for further development of good-quality theory in our field. Although theory is the 
pinnacle of our efforts in science (Kerlinger, 1986), the building blocks of a theory-focused 
research do not require a hypothetico-deductive approach to research; identifying compelling and 
interesting empirical relations that can help scientists understand a phenomenon are also useful 
(Hambrick, 2007; D. Miller, 2007). Ironically too, we would like to think we “do” theory; 
however, as compared to other fields we do not really do theory. I return to this point when 
discussing the next disease, arigorium.  
Disease 4: Arigorium 
There is a general lack of rigor in our field, whether in theory development or testing. As 
compared to other disciplines that are more formalized (e.g., economics), our field operates from 
a weak paradigm, in terms of widely agreed upon assumptions, models, and methods (Pfeffer, 
1993). For instance as regards theory, on a very basic level there is a general lack of precision in 
definitions, assumptions, and in expounding on the variables constituting the theory as well as 
their causal impact. This problem is evidenced in several theories including three of the most 
dominant theories in our field: Transformational leadership (van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013), 
charismatic leadership (Antonakis, Bastardoz, Jacquart, & Shamir, 2016), and leader-member 
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exchange theory (House & Aditya, 1997). This problem is one of theorizing that lacks in rigor, 
transparency, and precision—if we are to do theory properly we need to follow the examples of 
other disciplines and formalize theory (Adner, Polos, Ryall, & Sorenson, 2009); or at least be 
more precise with words, fleshing out assumptions, arguing counterfactually, clearly identifying 
the hypothesized causal mechanisms at play (Durand & Vaara, 2009) as well as the limits of the 
theory (Bacharach, 1989; Dubin, 1976).  
Apart from weak theorizing, our field does not pay the needed attention to testing 
phenomena rigorously: This problem is manifold and has to do with study design as well as with 
estimation. On the simplest level, the statistical threshold for what constitutes a significant result 
(i.e., p < .05) may be too lax and may need to be lowered to .001 (Johnson, Payne, Wang, Asher, 
& Mandal, in press), which may help lower false positive findings (Ioannidis, 2014). There are 
many more complex issues making it hard to document them all. Put simply, our field lags in 
using the appropriate statistical methods particularly with respect to modeling data in non-
experimental research (Antonakis, et al., 2010). Unless one only does basic experimental 
research, the usual estimation procedures in our field, ANOVA or OLS regression (coupled with 
the usual software i.e., SPSS), are insufficient to deal with the challenges researchers face today; 
in non-experimental settings the assumptions of these estimators are usually violated with respect 
to the exogeneity of the independent variables. Quantitative researchers are more cognizant of 
how to improve research standards because it is straightforward to demonstrate with analytical 
proofs or simulations what makes for a correct estimator. Only recently have top management 
journals expected authors to deal decisively with endogeneity (Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, & 
Mitchell, 2014; Guide Jr & Ketokivi, 2015; Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012), which is a 
welcome sign. As concerns qualitative research, it is thus hard to judge the rigor of such studies 
and opinions regarding what constitutes a good use of qualitative methods vary widely 
12 
 
(Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014; Dixon-Woods, Shaw, Agarwal, & Smith, 2004; Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). 
Disease 5: Disjunctivitis 
Because of the conditions that have allowed all the other diseases to proliferate, we 
witness a large volume of research produced. Researchers must enhance their reputations and 
stake out a territory, whether in terms of theory, a method, or a measure (cf. Barrett, 1972). They 
produce what they are mostly incentivized to do: Quantity (Bergh, Perry, & Hanke, 2006; Fanelli 
& Larivière, 2016; Grote, 2016; Larivière & Costas, 2016; Nosek, et al., 2012). Collaboration 
with coauthors—one failsafe way to boost output—is on the increase (Ductor, 2015). Given that 
articles are the unit of analysis counting toward productivity, there is a proliferation of 
publications via another pathway: A trend to produce short and rapid publications  (Bertamini & 
Munafò, 2012; Ellemers, 2013). In some fields, this increase in output has occurred across-the-
board and even affects the most prized of evidence: Systematic reviews and meta-analysis 
(Ioannidis, 2016a). Moreover being highly prolific increases the likelihood that a subset of papers 
go on to be highly cited (Larivière & Costas, 2016; Sandström & van den Besselaar, 2016). The 
end result is a voluminous set of articles that are fragmented both within and between disciplines 
(Ellemers, 2013; Wilson, 1998). 
Symptoms of the diseases 
When only statistically significant and novel results are published, individuals may game 
the system expressly; they may p-hack or engage in other questionable research practices. 
Interestingly, the proportion of support hypotheses receive increase as an article is transformed 
from dissertation to journal article (O'Boyle, Banks, & Gonzalez-Mulé, 2017). Of course, 
dissertations and published articles have different incentive structures, which may explain why 
when in a competitive publication game, researchers may, intentionally or not, use whatever 
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means (e.g., adding or removing controls, “cleaning” data so as to remove observations that are 
not helpful), both in experimental and non-experimental research, to make results statistically 
significant and thus publishable (Banks, Rogelberg, et al., 2016; O'Boyle, Banks, Walter, Carter, 
& Weisenberger, 2015; I. Vermeulen et al., 2015).  
As Nobel economist Ronald Coarse said: “if you torture the data long enough it will 
confess” (Tullock, 2001, p. 205). Banning the reporting of p-values, as Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology recently did, is not going to solve the problem because it is merely treating a 
symptom of the problem. There is nothing wrong with hypothesis testing and p-values per se as 
long as authors, reviewers, and action editors use them correctly (Abelson, 1997; Bettis, et al., 
2016; Cortina & Dunlap, 1997; García-Pérez, 2016; Murtaugh, 2014). Much of the 
argumentation against classical hypothesis testing framework is misplaced particularly because 
substantive effects beyond nil effects can be tested. That is, this framework does not preclude 
testing specific hypotheses against particular values or estimating models where parameters are 
constrained based on prior knowledge (Edwards & Berry, 2010). The source of the problem is 
that the winners in the publication race are those who have statistically significant—and ideally 
snazzy—results. Thus, changing the incentive structure, what constitutes “winning” (Bakker, et 
al., 2012) should reduce the prevalence of this disease to some extent. As a prime example, 
registered trials wherein the research design is first reviewed prior to gathering data, substantially 
increase the prevalence of null results and provides a more accurate assessment of treatment 
effects (Kaplan & Irvin, 2015).  
Another symptom resulting from theorrhea, and first discussed explicitly in our field by 
Kerr (1998) is HARKing—“hypothesizing  after the results are known.” HARKing appears to be 
highly prevalent in our field (Bosco, Aguinis, Field, Pierce, & Dalton, 2016). Briefly, because 
research must be grounded in original theory to get published in top journals, researchers will do 
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what it takes to make it seem “as if” they tested some novel theoretical insights. They first dig 
into their data to find statistically significant results that look potentially interesting and new, and 
then invent a plausible theory to be used upfront in the paper to give the impression that this 
theory drove the data-gathering and data-testing efforts of the researchers. Thus, authors are 
making up theory in a post-hoc way while pretending the theory was ex-ante. Capitalizing on 
chance in this way, and coupled with the fact that non-novel findings are hard to publish creates a 
situation where findings are rarely if ever replicated, and theories never trimmed or refined, 
resulting in theory that is not very useful (Cortina, 2016).  
Because of neophilia, significosis, and theorrhea, it is no wonder why null findings and 
replications are suppressed and exploratory work is ill-regarded (see Cortina, 2016; Ferguson & 
Heene, 2012; C. C. Miller & Bamberger, 2016). Some may think rightly so because exploratory 
work is about p-hacking (or maybe HARKing too). Well, some may see it this way or do research 
this way. As I see it, p-hacking is about capitalizing on chance by overfitting models to data 
(Leigh, 1988; Maccallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992)—of course, it is possible that some 
researchers HARK and then pass off their research as a theory-driven exercise. But, useful 
exploratory or inductive work is about relying on theory-free observation, and saying that at the 
outset, to discover important causal relations and then testing these observations in further 
experimentation. Theoretical explanations can come in later work and it is useful to know what 
the causal mechanism is that explains the relation.  
Medicine is a good example wherein observation has led to important serendipitous 
discoveries (Klein, 2008). Arguably one of the greatest discoveries in medicine, and for 
humankind, is anesthesia. Since first discovered in 1846, there have been many different 
anesthetic elements used to induce sleep and manage pain in patients (Robinson & Toledo, 2012). 
The most widely used anesthetic today is propofol (Yip et al., 2013) and it was discovered by 
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accident (DeMonaco, Ali, & Von Hippel, 2005). Doctors can be rather sure that if given the 
appropriate dosage of propofol, the patient will not wake up during surgery. However, the exact 
mechanism by which propofol works is not fully clear (DeMonaco, et al., 2005), though inroads 
continue to be made to understand how it works (Haeseler & Leuwer, 2003; Yip, et al., 2013).  
The lesson here is that exploratory work can lead to important discoveries (see also 
Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017), which need to be confirmed causally in subsequent research. More 
importantly is that the absence of a causal explanation does not preclude a causal effect; to 
influence policy and practice it is causal effects that we should going after (Antonakis, et al., 
2010). Of course, providing a causal explanation for a known causal effect is nice to have so that 
we can fully understand the nature of the phenomenon; but it is not required to affect practice or 
to make a difference to society.  
Furthermore, despite our focus on generating theory, too much of it makes it hard to put it 
all together (Ellemers, 2013). Moreover, the general lack of rigor in theory production is rather 
problematic; for example, constructs are oftentimes left undefined or not properly defined (e.g., 
charisma is a gift or mystical ability), and propositions are clearly tautological or defined by their 
outcomes (e.g., charismatic leaders are highly effective; see Antonakis, et al., 2016, for detailed 
discussions). Hazy theories and circular arguments cannot properly influence policy; only a 
clearly identified causal relation can (ideally with the mechanism explained). We need sharper 
definitions and to the extent possible to try figure out how to manipulate constructs of interest; as 
Kurt Lewin was credited to have said, “The best way to understand something is to try to change 
it.”  
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For instance, take the case of leader-member exchange theory (LMX), which, like the 
charisma construct, is riddled with issues
2
. Two decades ago, House and Aditya (1997) 
mentioned: “While it is almost tautological to say that good or effective leadership consists in 
part of good relationships between leaders and followers, there are several questions about such 
relationships to which answers are not intuitively obvious . . . . High-quality relationships may be 
influenced by a host of situational factors, follower attributes and behaviors, and leader 
behaviors. LMX theory does not specify these, but implies that the behavior of subordinates 
influences superiors to show support, delegate to subordinates a substantial amount of discretion 
in conducting their work, engage in open communication, and encourage mutual influence 
between themselves and their subordinates” (pp. 431-432). Thus, apart from LMX theorists 
defining and measuring LMX in terms of trust in the leader or leader-follower relationship 
quality (i.e., defined by its outcome), LMX per se depends on omitted causes that would predict 
the modelled dependent variable too, making it hard to know if LMX actually causes anything
3
. 
LMX is clearly an endogenous variable that shares many common causes with outcomes that it is 
meant to predict; if these causes are omitted, the effect of LMX on outcomes will be plagued by 
endogeneity and thus confounded. Has this theory been reformulated since the House-Aditya 
critique? Can LMX be manipulated in consequential settings? Unfortunately not; and, several 
meta-analyses have been conducted since, fed by endogeneity-rife estimates (Antonakis, 
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014).  
                                                          
2
 Readers from management can simply replace LMX with any other endogenous variable (e.g., organizational 
commitment/citizenship, perceptions of job enrichment), which is often used as a predictor of other outcomes.  
3
 An endogenous variable, y1, studied as such (i.e., an outcome) is not problematic. What does cause problems in 
estimation is if the endogenous variable is modelled as a predictor of another endogenous variable, y2. In this case, 
the coefficient of y1  y2 will be biased because y1 will correlate with omitted causes (i.e., the disturbance) of y2. The 
only way around this endogeneity problem is to randomize y1 (i.e., make it exogenous with respect to y2), to control 
for all known causes of y2 (which is difficult to do), to use instrumental variable estimation, where an exogenous 
cause x, is used to lock in the causal direction of y2 on y2, or to use a quasi-experimental procedure (see Antonakis et 
al., 2010).  
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LMX theory is not the only one at fault. Many leadership models, including the 
transformational-transactional leadership model, are on weak theoretical scaffolding (van 
Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013), and composed of endogenous variables (Antonakis, et al., 2016). 
For instance, leader intellectual stimulation of followers, a key part of transformational 
leadership, is conceptualized and measured to be an important predictor of follower performance. 
Yet, a leader may show more or less intellectual stimulation to a follower depending on follower 
skills or performance, because of other leader- or follower-level variables (e.g., personality), or 
because of organizational-level variables
4
. If any of these variables correlate with follower 
outcomes and are omitted from the model, estimates for intellectual stimulation will be biased.  
The lack of demonstrable rigor in theorizing is matched by a lack of rigor in testing. 
Reviews have shown that there are many threats to the validity of quantitative leadership studies, 
which means that much of it is not informative to policy (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014; 
Antonakis, et al., 2010; Fischer, et al., 2016). As concerns qualitative research, given the 
idiosyncratic methods used and a general lack of clear description of how data are extracted and 
analyzed, makes it hard to understand what was done and whether it is replicable (Antonakis, 
Bastardoz, et al., 2014; Dixon-Woods, et al., 2004; Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010; Gioia, et al., 2013). 
There are, however, many appropriate ways to conduct qualitative research bearing in mind 
sampling issues (Geddes, 2003; Gerring, 2007), measurement reliability (Wright, 2016), and 
counterfactual thinking (Geddes, 2003; Gerring, 2007; Gerring & McDermott, 2007). 
Given the diseases and their consequences, it is no wonder that there appears to be a 
proliferation of salami-sliced and marginal research in the field of management and business 
research (Karabag & Berggren, 2016); this problem is evident too even in research-synthesis 
efforts (Ioannidis, 2016a) and across disciplines (Wilson, 1998)! We need to proceed in 
                                                          
4
 In this case the endogeneity problem is more complicated and includes simultaneity (see Antonakis et al., 2010).  
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paradigm-driven steps, replicate, and incrementally extend, not try to radically reinvent (Nosek, 
et al., 2012). At this time, we have too many theories, many of which may be redundant (Banks, 
McCauley, Gardner, & Guler, 2016; Hoch, Bommer, Dulebohn, & Wu, 2016)—an atomization of 
science not only within but between disciplines (Wilson, 1998).  
We witness too an increase in number of authors on papers in management research 
(Acedo, Barroso, Casanueva, & Galán, 2006). More authors on papers is not necessarily bad and 
does predict better statistical conclusion validity (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014). Also, trends 
suggest that research done by teams goes on to be more cited than is solo work (Wuchty, Jones, 
& Uzzi, 2007). Beyond having more knowhow on the team, that articles with more co-authors go 
on to be more cited could be due to a variety of mechanisms, include a wider dissemination 
network (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014). Still, there is the possibility of negative 
externalities, including the free-rider problem (cf. Ductor, 2015). Authorship issues of this sort 
may have an impact on the integrity of research too (Marušić, Bošnjak, & Jerončić, 2011). More 
research is required to better understand whether there is a problem in our field with respect to 
authorship misuse (Banks et al., 2016). 
Consequences: Crises, lack of quality and impact  
Because of the above diseases, some branches of psychology, a key foundational 
discipline of leadership, are currently facing difficulties with respect to replicability (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). What precisely brought the 
problem to the fore is not entirely clear to me, but anonymous post-publication peer review (e.g., 
www.pubpeer.com), science-oriented blogging (e.g., see www.datacolada.org), and the media 
have probably played a role (a useful one too). Journals might not have an interest to be first 
movers because many editors may believe that replication failures or retractions harm the 
reputations of their journals. Au contraire! Journal editors that show the needed intestinal 
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fortitude strengthen the reputations of their journals (cf. Cortina, 2015). Misreported or 
manipulated data, or findings that fail reanalysis efforts have, depending on their severity, to be 
corrected or retracted (Atwater, et al., 2014).  
We are starting to see theories falling: High-profile cases include power posing (Ranehill, 
et al., 2015; Simmons & Simonsohn, in press; K. M. Smith & Apicella, 2016), which is relevant 
for leadership, and ego depletion theory (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2016; Lurquin et al., 2016) to 
name a couple. The leadership field too is replete with theories that may have been reformulated 
or fallen, if the field did not suffer from the five diseases. As with calls made for the field of 
industrial-organizational psychology in general, it is time that we begin to see how to trim or 
even cull theories that have overpopulated the research landscape (Cortina, 2016; Grote, 2016; 
Leavitt, Mitchell, & Peterson, 2010); we cannot sit and wait for the demise of their illustrious 
masters (Azoulay, Fons-Rosen, & Zivin, 2015).  
As concerns qualitative research, researchers appear to be distrustful of such research 
findings (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014; Gephart, 2004; Gerring, 2012; Wright, 2016), thus 
making it difficult to get such research into top journals (Wright, 2016). Those qualitative studies 
that do get published are significantly less cited as compared to work informed by other modes of 
inquiry (e.g., quantitative, review, or theory articles, see Antonakis, et al., 2016; Antonakis, 
Bastardoz, et al., 2014); qualitative papers also do not figure in the top cited papers relative to the 
base rate of articles produced (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014). But it does not have to be so as 
I discuss later regarding the kinds of qualitative articles I seek for this journal.  
Moreover, given the general lack of a unified paradigm, our field of social science 
research as compared to other disciplines does not get the attention or resources that it should—
this is not a new issue of course (Barrett, 1972; Pfeffer, 1993). We also do not affect public 
policy as much as we could (Amir et al., 2005). Next, although we like to measure impact in 
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terms of citations garnered, it appears that academic impact of the sort we do does not translate to 
practical impact on external stakeholders, that is, those outside of academia (Aguinis, Suárez-
González, Lannelongue, & Joo, 2012; Chan et al., 2014). In the field of leadership we face a 
similar problem; research findings, whatever their quality, are not used much by practitioners, 
who instead turn to unscientific popular books and fads (Zaccaro & Horn, 2003).  
Finally, the emphasis on producing quantity places a sword of Damocles over the heads of 
researchers, particularly early career researchers: They must ratchet up the output, despite the fact 
that common sense would suggest that quantity and quality are two performance indicators that 
might make for unusual bedfellows (Antonakis & Lalive, 2008; Bergh, et al., 2006). Though it is 
possible to be highly productive and have high quality work, it is unusual; and, having low 
productivity does not mean that the work is of high quality. Fetishizing statistical significance, 
favors the production of trivial research that risks being pointless: Statistical and theoretical 
significance are not isomorphic (Haslam & McGarty, 2001). Yet, the system favors the selection 
of such research because of incentives for publication quantity (Nosek, et al., 2012; Smaldino & 
McElreath, 2016), which creates a publication volume that is putting a strain on the review 
system (Bertamini & Munafò, 2012; Grote, 2016).  
We need better quality research that is cohesive and integrative—where new research is 
preceded by systematic reviews so that the territory is fully charted and known effects are used as 
benchmarks (Ioannidis, 2016b). A system that is producing a large volume of bad research 
(Smaldino & McElreath, 2016), disjunctive and marginal findings (Ellemers, 2013; Haslam & 
McGarty, 2001; Karabag & Berggren, 2016), many of which are ignored and fail to get cited 
(Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014), is simply not ideal. Instead we should be thinking in terms of 
(a) paradigm-driven research, starting in our field first (Nosek, et al., 2012), and then later, (b) 
consilience—the blending of the sciences and how bridges can be built between disparate 
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findings not only within the social sciences but also between disciplines (e.g., biology and social 
sciences, Wilson, 1998). 
How to make a more useful contribution to the research record 
Because of the five diseases, we are faced with a research production system that is not optimal. 
We need to change publication incentive structures and rethink how we evaluate research 
standards and what makes for a useful contribution. For this reason, and as documented in my 
“hello editorial,” our journal will now accept a wider range of article types (Antonakis, 2017). 
These will include registered reports and results-masked articles, replication and null results 
studies, and exploratory studies, in addition to several other types of articles, like commentaries 
and critiques as well as adversarial collaborations. The general idea here is that articles that 
make a contribution can do so not only because they are statistically significant or novel but 
because they can also make important discoveries, or contribute to cumulative scientific work; 
the latter is currently heavily biased by our collective failure to publish non-significant findings.  
At the same time, our field must focus on producing more rigorous and useful research, in 
terms of theorizing, study design, testing, and reporting. Fully dealing with the issues below will 
help ensure that manuscripts submitted to The Leadership Quarterly will not be desk rejected; I 
am reasonably confident too that considering the below suggestions will improve one’s chances 
to publish in other top journals.   
Theorize clearly 
Theories in our field are very imprecise, even by the standards of management (Edwards 
& Berry, 2010). We have to do better by being more exact in our predictions, which can help in 
testing for specific effects (Edwards & Christian, 2014); in this way, we can test stronger theory 
by using prior information, which is possible within the classical hypothesis testing framework 
(e.g., by constraining parameter, comparing nested models, or testing parameters against specific 
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values via Wald tests). Precision and formalization of theory has many benefits for later research 
(Adner, et al., 2009). We can also aspire to more theoretical sophistication. Models do not have to 
be complex (e.g., even “toy models” with simple utility functions will do), and the steps toward 
building a model are not that difficult to undertake (Varian, 1997).  
We should not mind “word theories,” of the sort usually published in our field (and as 
typically done in the Academy of Management Review), whether arguing using (a) propositions to 
describe causal relations, (b) narrative arguments to identify patterns, connections, and process 
theories, or (c) identifying typologies (Delbridge & Fiss, 2013). What is most important is that 
the theory is clearly thought out (Durand & Vaara, 2009), terms are precisely defined 
(MacKenzie, 2003; P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2016), and the relations clearly 
identified along with boundary conditions  (Bacharach, 1989; Dubin, 1976).  
What is most disturbing is tautological theorizing, reminiscent of what Wicklund (1990) 
calls “zero-level” theories, those where the explanandum redescribes the explanans. A more 
subtle version of such theorizing is “endogenous theorizing,” which specifies endogenous 
variables (e.g., good leader-member relations) as causes of other endogenous variables (e.g., 
follower satisfaction). “Upstream causes” (e.g., stable individual difference, or higher-level 
factors like contextual factors) must be identified in such models, and the causal effects of 
endogenous variables on other endogenous variables must be clearly articulated along with their 
common causes (which has implications for causal testing, discussed later).  
Be more creative in measurement  
The typical cross-sectional survey design has been a workhorse for our field, but it has 
reduced policy implications because of its limit in measurement, its static nature and obvious 
endogeneity threats; it is also becoming rather overused in our field and in management in 
particular. However, depending on how effects manifest themselves over time it can be policy 
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relevant (see Fischer, et al., 2016). There is so much we still need to learn and it will take more 
than cross-sectional snapshots to get there. If one of our goals is to affect practice, we also need 
to figure out better ways to understand the leadership production pipeline, from selection to 
development and from individual to organizational-wide leadership (Day & Dragoni, 2015; Day, 
Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014). 
There are many ways to get to leadership by measuring different kinds of variables from 
various sources, including data that is archival-historiometric (Barnes, Dang, Leavitt, Guarana, & 
Uhlmann, 2016; Friedrich et al., 2014; Simonton, 2003, 2009), neurological (Waldman, Wang, & 
Fenters, 2016), genetic (De Neve, Mikhaylov, Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2013), hormonal 
(van der Meij, Schaveling, & van Vugt, 2016), facial (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 
2005),  economic (Zehnder, Herz, & Bonardi, in press), big data (Tonidandel, King, & Cortina, in 
press), or agent-based simulation data (McHugh et al., 2016). Looking at leadership from 
evolutionary angles would also be very useful (J. E. Smith et al., 2016); even data from insects 
can help explain the need for leadership (Hodgkin, Symonds, & Elgar, 2014). Importantly, as we 
discover more about leadership from different angles, we can begin to identify, for instance, how 
to make links to the brain sciences, evolutionary biology, and cultural transmission; in this way, 
we can one day strive to provide a more unified explanation of human behavior, using biology, 
the social sciences, even humanities (cf. Wilson, 1998).  
Getting to leadership via different means can also be accomplished by using different 
types of designs. For instance the regression discontinuity design is useful for studying a local 
treatment effect that is relevant to practitioners in a specific context or an entire system—it most 
closely mimics the experimental design in terms of validity of causal inference (Antonakis, et al., 
2010; Mellor & Mark, 1998). Yet, it is seriously underused in our field. Another unknown design 
is the difference-in-differences design (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Meyer, 1995), which can be used 
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as an alternative to case studies for identifying causal effects over time in systems (e.g., two 
company sites having received a different treatment) or even large entities like countries. Both 
these designs are contextually rooted and provide practitioners with specific information about a 
causal effect relevant to them.  
Moreover, data from unusual contexts—not typically thought of in organizational 
science—can help shed important light on the leadership phenomenon and will be particularly 
welcome (see Bamberger & Pratt, 2010). Historical-, archeological-, or geographic-inspired 
studies would be especially interesting (Diamond & Robinson, 2010).  
Design realistic experiments 
The sure way to deal with the endogeneity problem is to manipulate the modelled 
independent variables; thus, I would like to see more experiments published in our journal. 
Experiments have much to teach us (Brown & Lord, 1999) and there are many ways in which 
experimental settings can be creatively used to study important real-world analogs (Zelditch, 
1969). Although some are skeptical of laboratory experiments, findings from laboratory and field 
settings concord pretty well (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Herbst & Mas, 2015; 
Mitchell, 2012). In addition, students who partake in experiments do not act that differently from 
individuals in the general population insofar as social preference-type decisions are concerned 
(Falk, Meier, & Zehnder, 2013). Of course, the sample and setting must be appropriate for the 
problem at hand and the population to which one wishes to generalize (Haslam & McGarty, 
2001; Hogarth, 2005).  
Although it is not a requirement, incentivizing participants when it makes sense to so do 
and is realistic could help improve the ecological validity of the findings (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2001; Zizzo, 2010). That is, decisions taken and performance outcomes should have clear 
payoffs; moreover, the more consequential the decisions and the outcomes are, and the more 
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meaningful and realistic the situation is for participants, the more valid the setting becomes. It is 
one thing measuring intentions and impressions of participants in settings that have hypothetical 
outcomes and where participants can engage in “cheap talk” or give socially-desirable answers to 
questions; it is another thing measuring actual choices, having real-life tradeoffs that affect 
participants’ payoffs in situ. 
Even “paper people”—vignette-type or scenario—experiments can be useful (Aguinis & 
Bradley, 2014; Woehr & Lance, 1991); in my book, such an experiment well done may beat an 
endogeneity plagued-field study. Nowadays it is not so difficult to add more realism to the 
stimulus materials (e.g., using video materials, actors; see: N. P. Podsakoff, Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Klinger, 2013); even more high-tech options, like virtual reality are now 
affordable and have many broad applications (Bombari, Mast, Canadas, & Bachmann, 2015). I 
hope also to see more field experiments in our journal; consequential and ecologically-valid 
settings are particularly welcome because such designs are the “gold standard” for causal, and 
externally valid, evidence (Chatterji, Findley, Jensen, Meier, & Nielson, 2016; Eden, 2017; 
Harrison & List, 2004).  
Of course, experiments are not a panacea and must be carefully designed. Manipulation 
checks should be used if necessary and appropriate (Sigall & Mills, 1998); they should be 
avoided or manipulation checks using another sample should be used if the checks in the original 
sample may induce suspicion or reveal the purpose of the study and possibly trigger demand 
effects (i.e., where participants act in a way that they think is expected or desirable). Attention 
must be paid to not making unfair comparisons (W. H. Cooper & Richardson, 1986), which could 
trigger demand effects too. For instance, typical power-priming studies (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee, 2003), in which the treatment group is told to think about a time they had power and the 
control group thinks about something banal (what they did yesterday), is highly problematic 
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(Sturm & Antonakis, 2015); such a design could trigger demand effects (Orne, 2009; Rosenthal 
& Rosnow, 2009; Zizzo, 2010) and consequently, confounded estimates. Or how about the 
problem of comparing a possibly demand-driven treatment stemming from subjects receiving 
training and hence attention (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996), to a control group that is given 
no attention (cf. W. H. Cooper & Richardson, 1986)? Experimenters should consider having 
placebo controls or alternative treatments to serve as strong counterfactuals. 
Finally, I hope to see little or no deception used (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008; Ortmann & 
Hertwig, 1997, 2002). If used, it should be as a last resort only. Institutionalized deception is hard 
to justify and it sets a bad example to the very students we train and who will later enter working 
life. With thorough planning and an appropriate budget I believe that most studies can be run 
without using deception. If they cannot, perhaps the nature of the experiment is unethical per 
se—for example, as has been often discussed with regard to the Milgram electric shock 
experiments (there are other, deeper ethical complexities involved in the Milgram experiments, 
see: Haslam, Reicher, Millard, & McDonald, 2015). Obfuscating the purpose of the experiment 
or the manipulations is not deception; however, lying, misleading, or purposefully 
misrepresenting the purpose of the experiment is (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002). Repeated 
deception engenders suspicion in participants and could affect participants choices in experiments 
(Jamison, Karlan, & Schechter, 2008; Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002).  
Interestingly, the best concordance between laboratory and field results comes from 
industrial-organizational psychology and not social psychology (Mitchell, 2012)—although the 
latter is known to use deception quite regularly (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002), it is not clear what 
explains this difference in concordance. Interestingly too, economics experiments (Camerer et al., 
2016) have a much higher replicability rate than do psychology experiments (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015); again, the reason for this finding is not clear but it may have an explanation 
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in a combination of factors including that economists: (a) use more formal theory, (b) put a 
premium on causal identification, (c) incentivize participants, (d) do not use deception, and (d) 
are usually very transparent about methods and sharing data (cf. Camerer, et al., 2016). It is also 
possible too that behavioral economists have “borrowed” mostly from the best psychology 
theories. 
Do quality qualitative research 
Qualitative and small-n size research can be very useful, particularly when studying large, 
unusual, or elite entities (Gerring & McDermott, 2007); such research can provide important 
contextual insights about leadership phenomena. Thus, qualitative research plays a needed role in 
understanding leadership and I would like to see more well-done qualitative studies in our 
journal. Some obvious questions that I raise when reading qualitative papers are: Are data 
reliably coded and are the findings replicable? That is, if an independent team analyzed the data 
would they come to similar findings? Are the findings trustworthy? As Gerring (2012, p. 94) has 
noted: “replicability is an idea for which all research ought to strive. Arguably, it is even more 
important for qualitative work than for quantitative work, given the degree of authorial 
intervention that is usually involved in the latter (and hence the greater possibility of investigator 
bias).”  
The key issue here has to do with measurement (Wright, 2016); human judgment, even 
expert judgment is fallible (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) and processes information in 
expectancy-based ways (Fiske, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
5
. Thus, researchers using the 
qualitative method should be as transparent as possible in their procedures (Weiner-Levy & 
Popper-Giveon, 2013), to use mixed methods when possible and to triangulate (Bansal & Corley, 
                                                          
5
 This problem is not unique to qualitative research; though it is more difficult in qualitative research to establish the 
validity and reliability of measures used. 
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2011; Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011). When feasible, data should be coded (Wright, 
2016) and the reliability in the data codings be demonstrated (J. R. Landis & Koch, 1977; Lin, 
1989). Also, an often ignored issue in qualitative research is the failure to obtain data on 
contrasting cases (Geddes, 2003). For example, to understand what drives high performance, 
intensively studying only what high performing entities have in common is not helpful—what if 
low performing entities also share these characteristics (Denrell, 2003, 2005)? I agree that 
studying extreme cases can be interesting for some types of research problems (Gerring, 2007), 
but understanding causes of outcomes, generating propositions about causes of outcomes for 
future testing, or understanding processes requires counterfactual thinking and observation, along 
space and time (Gerring & McDermott, 2007; Hastie & Dawes, 2001).  
The medical sciences may be useful here particularly with respect to testing effects using 
very small samples wherein, for instance, a group having been exposed to some treatment or 
condition (e.g., having a particular brain lesion) is compared to a matched control group (J. 
Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996). Matching of this sort can be achieved in a 
variety of ways, even on a basic level (Grimes & Schulz, 2005), though ideally should be 
undertaken with a statistical algorithm (Li, 2013; Niccolai et al., 2007). Any type of entity can be 
matched in this manner (e.g., individual, company, country). Having controls of this sort can be 
helpful in improving causal inference and in building better theories (Gerring & McDermott, 
2007). 
Do not ignore endogeneity 
Although there is a lot of good published work on leadership, unfortunately there are a lot 
of methodologically weak studies because of endogeneity issues (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 
2014; Antonakis, et al., 2010; Fischer, et al., 2016). Endogeneity, which is a matter of degree, 
biases estimates in unknown ways; the higher the endogeneity, the more the bias to the point 
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where results cannot inform policy. Yet, endogeneity-threatened results have been used to inform 
research and practice; way too many meta-analyses have been done that fail to fully consider and 
transparently discuss the endogeneity-riddled data that feed them. Meta-analysis are supposed to 
be at the highest rung of the hierarchy of evidence (Evans, 2003); but if not well done how useful 
can they be to policy (Ioannidis, 2016a)?  
Much has been written on the topic of endogeneity and how to correct for it but journals 
in management and applied psychology have been slow to adopt more robust standards in 
causally testing relations. When independent variables have not been manipulated a researcher 
must ensure that the estimator used is consistent (i.e., as the sample size increases coefficients get 
closer to the true effect) and unbiased (i.e., the mean coefficient approaches the true effect in 
repeated sampling). It is essential that authors reflect critically about the exogeneity of their 
measures; and it is important to note that the exogeneity of a variable is firstly a theoretical 
question (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Stock & Watson, 2011; Wooldridge, 2002).  
For instance, a common issue I see is to justify using a particular design—splitting 
measurement periods into two or more times (or splitting rater sources)—as a good remedy for 
reducing common source/method effects. Depending on the nature of what is being measured, 
such a procedure could reduce some of these effects (P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003; P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012); however, doing so is not 
sufficient to ensure exogeneity of the modeled independent variable (Antonakis, et al., 2010)
6
.  
Another common issue I see is modeling of only one measured leadership style (e.g., only 
empowering leadership) in predicting an outcome. Beyond failing to control for key predictors of 
                                                          
6
Simply measuring x at time 1 (xt1) does not guarantee that it is a likely cause of y at time 2 (yt2)—the well-known 
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy (Kerlinger, 1986). If x is not exogenous, both x and y could be explained by an 
omitted common cause, z, which will usually correlate with itself over time, that is, cov(zt1,zt2 ≠ 0) and consequently 
explain the xt1  yt2 relation. It is also possible that y is a cause of x and cov(yt1,yt2 ≠ 0). Similar problems are 
evident too when splitting rating sources.  
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outcomes (at the follower, leader, or unit level), which may correlate with the modelled style, it is 
important to also control for competing correlated leadership styles in predicting an outcome 
(e.g., see Banks, McCauley, et al., 2016; Fischer, et al., 2016; Hoch, et al., 2016); failure to 
control for these competing constructs will engender omitted variable bias and does not inform us 
of the incremental validity of the construct either.  
There are so many other endogeneity-related issues too that are often not adequately dealt 
with; interested readers should refer to some introductory sources that discuss endogeneity and 
how to deal with it (Antonakis, Bendahan, et al., 2014; Bascle, 2008; B. H. Hamilton & 
Nickerson, 2003; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). I list a few more major sources of endogeneity bias 
here; these concern typical empirical articles, though they can be used in the context of an 
exploratory framework too (though paying particular attention to issues like capitalization on 
chance and out of sample prediction are very important here, Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan, 
& Obermeyer, 2015):  
 Using HLM (random-effects) incorrectly (Halaby, 2004; McNeish, Stapleton, & Silverman, 
2016) or failing to partial out fixed effects by including the cluster means of the within 
variables (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008); 
 Comparing groups when selection to group is endogenous (Bascle, 2008; Certo, Busenbark, 
Woo, & Semadeni, 2016; Li, 2013) or based known a cut-off but not modeling this 
assignment via a regression discontinuity design (Cook, 2008);  
 Estimating mediation models via Baron-Kenny or the Preacher-Hayes type method, but not 
comparing estimates to an instrumental-variable estimator (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Shaver, 
2005)—bootstrapping an inconsistent estimate does not make it consistent; 
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 Sampling on the dependent variable and not accounting for survival bias or other forms of 
selection effects (Denrell, 2003, 2005);  
 Using self-selected samples or so-called “snowball samples” (Marcus, Weigelt, Hergert, Gurt, 
& Gelléri, 2016) and not reflecting on how samples can produce bias (Fiedler, 2000); 
 Using partial least squares (PLS)—editors are desk rejecting articles that use PLS (Guide Jr & 
Ketokivi, 2015) and I will do likewise because PLS should ever be used in applied work 
(Rönkkö, McIntosh, Antonakis, & Edwards, 2016). Authors should use 2SLS if they require 
to use a limited information estimator; 
 Ignoring overidentification tests (i.e., the 𝜒2 test of fit) in simultaneous or structural equation 
models (Ropovik, 2015)—such models have biased estimates (Bollen, Kirby, Curran, Paxton, 
& Chen, 2007; Hayduk, 2014; McIntosh, 2007); indexes of fit (CFI, RMSEA) should not be 
trusted because they depend on idiosyncrasies of the model (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, & 
Paxton, 2008; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Savalei, 2012). Note, I will consider articles that 
fail the 𝜒2 overidentification test, as long as the potential source of failure is acknowledged 
with a caveat too that estimates may be biased, and that recommendations are made to 
develop and test a better model in future research.  
The list goes on (for some checklists see Antonakis, et al., 2010). Thus authors should find 
creative ways to harness exogenous variance in models. Beyond the introductory sources I 
referred to earlier, there are also several other accessible sources that will be useful to authors 
who wish to read more about endogeneity and quasi-experimental designs (see Angrist & 
Pischke, 2014; Antonakis, et al., 2010; Bascle, 2008; Clougherty, Duso, & Muck, 2016; Cook, 
Shadish, & Wong, 2008; G. J. Duncan, Magnusson, & Ludwig, 2004; Gennetian, Magnuson, & 
Morris, 2008; B. H. Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Shadish & Cook, 1999; Shadish, Cook, & 
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Campbell, 2002). And, some might be tempted to say that the problems of endogeneity are 
overblown and all this is a matter of opinion. It is not. Estimators that have been mathematically 
proven to be consistent for particular data and conditions must be used when relevant (e.g., 
Rubin, 1977). 
Note too that methodological rigorous articles that deal correctly with endogeneity issues 
tend to be more cited (Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al., 2014; Bergh, et al., 2006). Still, that is not to 
say that journals should never consider publishing studies that report relations that are just 
“correlational”; they should consider these for publication if the correlations observed have 
important implications for future research and if authors clearly identify correlational evidence 
for what it is (do not try to sell it as causal).  
Be transparent with data, methods, and reporting 
 Transparency is a virtue that should be rewarded in the publication process. Transparency, 
whether for qualitative or quantitative studies concerns the data gathered, the design, the analyses 
methods, and the results. Transparency begins with declaring all data that were gathered and their 
stopping rules, along with all treatments, and all experiments, and not selectively reporting 
statistically significant findings (see Nosek, et al., 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  
Summary data for manuscripts using a quantitative design should be reported in the form 
of a correlation matrix, ideally at the item level, with means and standard deviations (for 
experimental data, binary variables for conditions should be included in the correlation matrix), 
or in another appropriate form. For studies that do not have a large sample size, authors should 
include the data in an Appendix table. To the extent possible, authors should consider posting 
data on permanent repositories (Stodden et al., 2016). Authors of meta-analysis should include in 
an Appendix all studies used in the meta-analysis along with sample sizes and effect sizes of 
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these articles; they should also conduct appropriate tests to determine if there is possible 
publication bias (Kepes, Banks, & Oh, 2014).  
In terms of reporting estimates, it is important to fully report the size of the effect and the 
uncertainty of the estimate. The standard error carries the key information needed and must be 
reported along with the exact p-value (unless the p-value is very small in which case p < .0001 
will suffice); confidence intervals can be reported too in tables, as well as in text for key findings. 
As for measure of effect, elasticities or semi-elasticities, or the like (depending on the metrics 
used, e.g., a change of 1 unit in x increases y by 33.2%), standardized estimates (if warranted and 
if measurement errors are removed from y and x), or some other metric of effect (odds ratio, 
incidence response ratio, etc.) can help establish the economic or practical significance of the 
results, as is plotting results and showing marginal effects, particularly for non-linear models.  
Reporting transparency should be such that for quantitative studies, researchers should be 
able to reanalyze the same data and produce the same results. As concerns this journal, in all 
cases, raw data whether quantitative or qualitative must be made available to editor if requested; 
thus, authors should make appropriate provisions to have the necessary authorization from 
institutional bodies or sponsors to share the data with the editor in an anonymized/redacted 
manner. The study should fully describe its methods and procedures so that other researchers are 
able to faithfully reproduce it (see Atwater, et al., 2014; Cortina, et al., 2016; Goodman, Fanelli, 
& Ioannidis, 2016; Nosek et al., 2015); computational steps taken to arrive at analyzed datasets 
and results, as well as programing and needed computer code must be fully disclosed (Atwater, et 
al., 2014; Stodden, et al., 2016). Finally, the limitations of the article should be honestly assessed 
and discussed.  
Declare conflicts of interest 
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Oftentimes researchers in our field do not declare conflicts of interest defined as “a set of 
conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest [e.g.,] . . . the validity of 
research . . . tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain)” 
(Thompson, 1993, p. 573). Authors must declare conflicts of interest if they are reporting on a 
questionnaire measure from which they stand to gain commercially at the time of review or in the 
future (by selling it via a publisher). Other instances can include reporting on consulting methods, 
training programs or methods, or software. This issue is very salient in other disciplines like in 
the medical sciences (Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 2003; Ioannidis, 2014; Papanikolaou et al., 2001; 
Thompson, 1993); it is becoming more prevalent in the social sciences as attested by ethics 
polices and guidelines for authors at many journals. 
Be an honest broker  
Our goal as scientists is to do good science and to report fully and accurately; it is not to 
push an ideological agenda. Sometimes we may not like what we find because it contradicts what 
we were expecting or hoping to find (Eagly, 2016). Take the case of the effect of women on 
corporate boards. Advocates for having more women may want to believe one thing (i.e., that 
more women means better performance); however, well-done science shows that it may not 
matter or may even reduce performance (Adams, 2016; Matsa & Miller, 2013). As mentioned by 
Eagly (2016, p. 213): “research literatures are often much more extensive than anticipated by 
most advocates, who may fix on particular studies that support their favored policy positions, 
with little concern for how typical, generalizable, or scientifically valid their findings are. 
Psychologists and other social scientists may be swept up by the excitement of seeing their 
findings used in advocacy and policy contexts.” In other words, research must be done, reported, 
and synthesized in a responsible and honest way. 
Conclusion 
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I have attempted a tour de force for how we can improve our scientific practices. Much of what I 
have written has focused on how better to manage the publication process, and how to best 
incentivize researchers. I focused on technical and methodological elements that we must 
improve on. I believe that the actions I suggest are a serious step forward to “vaccinating” our 
field against significosis, neophilia, theorrhea, arigorium, and disjunctivitis. In doing so, I believe 
that we will publish articles that will make useful contributions, that will be rigorous, and that 
will make a difference to research or practice.  
Finding different ways to study leadership is what will take our knowledge base to the 
next level. In reflecting on the recent discovery of gravitational waves, an editorial in the journal 
Science stated: “measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so” (attributed to 
Galileo Galilei, see: Turner, 2016, p. 1243). Of course we are not physicists nor will we be able 
to elaborate eloquent theories like that of general relativity or to make precise enough measures 
to detect outcomes akin to gravitation ways. However, in most instances we can accomplish the 
following steps for a particular phenomenon: 
1. conceive of and describe a construct, its different states and forms 
2. explain how the construct is affected or can affect other constructs, whether causally 
or in a process 
3. identify how the system of relations is bounded by space or time 
4. demonstrate how the studied phenomenon can solve problems 
5. build an explanatory bridge of this phenomenon to another discipline 
Developing different ways to measure constructs and their outcomes in a rigorous and 
reliable way, coding or quantifying the variables, exploring and observing them in situ, linking 
them to other variables, experimenting with them, testing their limits, showing how they affect 
practice, as well as understanding their proximal or ultimate causes is what we should be 
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pursuing, and this a cohesive way. Each of these steps could be a study in its own right, would 
take years to fully understand, and might not have immediate applications; yet the steps 
together—moving from basic to applied research and then reaching out to another discipline—
each help illuminate the nature of the phenomenon. 
Moreover, beyond doing our science better and more creatively, we should also reflect on 
what we are doing, on whether we are asking the right questions, and trying to solve the right 
problems (cf. Ellemers, 2013). Such reflection must challenge what we do so that we never lose 
sight of whom we are serving. Our leitmotif should always be: So what? Is it rigorous? Will it 
make a difference?  
Finally, by improving on how we do our science I believe that what we publish will make 
a difference and have an impact; it is not just about this journal but collectively what we do as 
scientists that matters. We must do our science better; never mind how impact is measured, 
rescaled, or conceptualized, and whether it considers impact on social media, policy, or 
elsewhere. Doing better on journal impact factor or other individual-level metrics are not goals in 
themselves; doing better science is.  
The editorial team of this journal is passionate about doing good science and ensuring that 
what we publish matters. But, if we chase success we might never find it. If we all follow our 
passion and do good science, success will find its way to us.  
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